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 Abstract 
While previous research on temporary employment has shown that certain labour market groups are 
more likely than others to enter this kind of inferior employment, there has been only little research on 
the question to what extent these allocation patterns have changed over time. Against the background 
of pervasive structural and institutional changes that affected the German labour market since the 
beginning of the 1990s there are reasons to believe that allocation patterns have changed as well. 
However, on a theoretical level there are different views regarding the quality of these changes. 
Whereas some scholars argue that social inequality is enhanced along the existing lines of social divi-
sion, others maintain that risks are less and less socially structured. To evaluate this question empiri-
cally we use data from the German Mikrozensus for the period from 1989 to 2005. The analysis 
reveals that, first, on the aggregate level the overall share of temporary employment has only slightly 
increased during that time period. Second, as indicated by the results, particularly those individuals 
belonging to groups that already have had a weak labour market position were increasingly allocated 
to temporary jobs. Third, contrary to the thesis of a de-structuration of social inequality, the findings 
reveal no decline in the overall importance of “classical” determinants of temporary employment 
relationships.  
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1  Introduction 
During the last two decades the German labour market has undergone a deep crisis and severe 
transformation. This profound restructuring process was inter alia accompanied by an increase of the 
share of so called flexible or non-standard employment as one form of labour market flexibilisation 
(Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000). By using forms of flexible employment German firms tried to 
counter a growing macroeconomic uncertainty as well as an increased international competition. 
However, the category “flexible employment relationships” encompasses very different types of flexi-
ble work arrangements that are assumed to lead to very different socio-economic consequences for 
the workers employed in these employment relations. One simple but still useful classification distin-
guishes between employment forms of internal and of external flexibility (Atkinson 1985). Whereas the 
former means adjusting working times, training and firm-internal workplace reorganisation, the latter 
refers to the usage of temporary contract, outsourcing and subcontracting. In this paper we focus on a 
very prominent form of external flexibility, namely temporary employment. Temporary jobs are char-
acterised by contracts of limited duration that ends automatically after their expiry. Through temporary 
jobs employers are given the chance to lower their labour input adjustment costs as these contracts 
reduce the firing costs (Bentolila and Bertola 1990; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002).  
Temporary work has induced fierce discussions in the scientific literature and in the public debate. 
Proponents of labour market flexibilisation argue that by reducing firing costs temporary contracts 
enhance the employment chances of labour market outsiders and can thus provide a “bridge” to the 
labour market. A contrasting perspective is that temporary work is associated with lower wages, poor 
working conditions, higher unemployment risks, and small chances for further promotion. In the latter 
view temporary jobs are seen as being “traps” that create or at least help to stabilise a segmentation 
of the labour market. Many recent studies have found empirical evidence for this “segmentation” per-
spective (Amuedo-Dorantes 2000; Booth, Francesconi and Frank 2002; Giesecke and Groß 2003; 
Kalleberg 2000). Importantly, the reported negative effects of temporary jobs can be regarded as 
being structural as they are solely due to the idiosyncratic positional characteristic of temporary jobs 
(i.e. reduced employment protection) and not to individual differences of the job holders (e.g. with 
respect to educational levels). Given such structural disadvantages of temporary employment the 
question is relevant who enters such employment relations. Hence, it is important to understand the 
allocation processes of individuals to these inferior labour market positions. Moreover, against the 
background of a far-reaching structural change it becomes even more important to investigate the 
shifts in the allocation patterns and their consequences for the structure of social inequality.   
However, while there are some studies on the determinants of temporary jobs in the German labour 
market (Buchholz and Kurz 2005; Giesecke 2006; Giesecke and Groß 2003; Groß 1999; Schömann, 
Rogowski and Kruppe 1998), there is only very limited evidence on how these determinants have 
changed over time. For example, Schömann et al. (1998) compare the incidence of temporary con-
tracts disaggregated by gender, age and educational level in the 1980s and early 1990s. They find 
that gender-specific rates converge over time such that the disadvantage for women with respect to 
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the risk of holding a temporary contract diminishes over time. The analysis for age and educational 
groups, respectively, is limited to two or four time points such that no real trend can be detected. 
Furthermore, their trend analysis is only based on simple bivariate models and thus neglects other 
potential confounding influences. Thus, so far there is no study that uses multivariate analyses to 
systematically investigate whether these allocation patterns have changed over time. However, given 
the substantial structural changes in the German labour market during the last two decades the latter 
question becomes relevant. As it is outlined in the theoretical section of this paper, there are reasons 
to believe that structural changes like globalisation, educational expansion or rising levels of unem-
ployment as well as institutional changes like modifications of labour law legislation or the weakening 
of unions’ power might have had an impact on the process of allocating people to temporary jobs.  
Therefore, this paper aims at giving some new insights about potential changes in the allocation pat-
terns of temporary employment. Specifically, the paper contributes to the existing literature in three 
ways. First, we will answer the question whether or not the risk of holding a temporary contract 
changed for certain socioeconomic groups in Germany during the period from 1989 to 2005, which is 
an improvement compared to earlier studies that are restricted to short time periods or only to one 
time point. Using data from the German Mikrozensus, we are able to draw inferences from a large 
national sample and, furthermore, we can control for a rich set of individual and structural variables. 
Second, we evaluate if the nexus of “classical” determinants, e.g. age, education, and occupational 
class, and temporary employment has in general remained unchanged or if these determinants have 
become either more or less important for the allocation process. However, if the predictive power of 
“classical” dimensions of social inequality changes residual variation is likely to change as well. Thus, 
in order to account for changing residual variation we, third, compare results from standard logistic 
regressions with heterogeneous choice models. From a statistical point of view, heteroscedasticity 
induced by changing residual variation over time biases the results from standard logistic regressions. 
Heterogeneous choice models try to account for heteroscedasticity by modelling explicitly the residual 
variation, thereby allowing for an unbiased estimation of parameters in case of non-constant variance 
in the unobserved part of the model.  
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss structural and institutional changes that 
may have influenced the risk patterns in the process of allocating people to temporary employment 
over time. Section 3 introduces the data set, variables and the statistical methods used. In section 4, 
results of the empirical analysis are discussed. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Changes in the allocation to temporary employment 
Previous empirical studies have shown that the risk of holding a temporary contract is related to 
various individual as well as job-related characteristics (a.o. Giesecke and Groß 2003; Schömann, 
Rogowski and Kruppe 1998). On a theoretical level, however, there are different explanations for 
these allocation patterns. One popular approach relates characteristics of workers (such as age, sex, 
Arbei tspapiere -  Mannheimer  Zentrum für  Europäische Sozia l forschung  112  
 - 3 -
nationality or education) and of jobs (such as firm-size or sector) to temporary employment by refer-
ring to labour market segmentation. According to this line of reasoning, the labour market is divided 
into labour market segments (Doeringer and Piore 1985 [1971]), which differ in the kind of jobs they 
offer.1 In the simplest version of this approach there is a primary segment offering well paid positions 
with good working conditions and structured career ladders and a secondary segment entailing short 
term, low-paid work providing no career prospects. In a further distinction, the primary labour market is 
differentiated into an upper and a lower primary sector (Piore 1978). While the upper primary sector is 
characterised by positions that require general skills and high levels of flexibility, the lower primary 
sector is dominated by positions that require firm-specific skills and long-term relationships. Given 
these structural features of the labour market temporary jobs can primarily be seen as elements of the 
secondary segment, where employers use temporary workers as a buffer stock to regulate short-term 
fluctuations in demand, but also as an important element of the upper primary segment, which exhibits 
high levels of flexibility. 
As the number of potential determinants of temporary employment is rather large, we want to focus 
the following discussion on the effects of education, age and occupational class. These characteristics 
are important determinants of temporary jobs and constitute core elements of social stratification and 
inequality. With respect to education, there is a well documented nonlinear relationship between a 
worker’s educational level and her risk of holding a temporary employment, with especially high risks 
for low educated persons without vocational training and for university degree holders (a.o. Giesecke 
and Groß 2003). This U-shaped pattern corresponds to the idea of highly educated persons with 
general skills being allocated to the upper primary labour market segment, workers with vocational 
skills being allocated to the lower primary segment and low educated workers being allocated to the 
secondary labour market.2  
                                                     
1  There is considerable disagreement about the reasons for the emergence of these segments. While some 
argue that labour market segmentation arises because of costly monitoring and uncertain product demand 
(Saint-Paul 1996) or as result of an interaction of demand for specific skills, training on-the-job and firm-
specific customs (Doeringer and Piore 1985 [1971]), others maintain that segmentation results from the 
employers’ strategy of “divide and conquer” and thus helps to reproduce the hegemony of capitalism (Reich, 
Gordon and Edwards 1973).  
2  It should be noted that labour market segments are usually defined by characteristics of the jobs (stability, 
existence of career ladders etc.) and not by characteristics of employees. However, it is expected that 
employees showing certain characteristics are concentrated in “corresponding” labour market segments. Thus 
employees holding higher educational credentials can be found more often in the upper primary segment, 
while employees having high specific human capital – which is acquired through vocational training – can 
mostly be found in the lower primary segment. In the secondary labour market segment mostly employees 
without educational credentials or other disadvantaged groups as for example ethnic minorities can be found. 
From the assumption of the existence of such labour market segments we try to derive hypotheses about the 
effects individual characteristics have on the likelihood of being in temporary employment. We do not try to 
operationalise labour market segments. For example, the assumption that highly qualified employees can 
mostly be found in the upper primary segment does not mean that the upper primary segment is defined by 
this type of employees. 
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Besides education, a worker’s age can be expected to be associated with the risk of holding a tempo-
rary contract. According to labour market segmentation theory, young persons will be more often 
found in the secondary labour market and, thus, confronted with a higher probability of getting a 
temporary job. Firms try to establish loose employment relationships particularly with young persons 
since they lack, in contrast to the more experienced workers, work experience and seniority because 
of their short employment history.3 This prediction is confirmed by previous studies for Germany, 
which show that the risk of holding a temporary contract is especially high for young persons (a.o. 
Buchholz and Kurz 2005; Schömann, Rogowski and Kruppe 1998).  
Finally, the risk of holding a temporary contract can be assumed to vary with occupational class as 
sociological theory in general predicts different labour market risks across occupational classes. 
Goldthorpe (1995; 2000) distinguishes low-skilled jobs based on a labour contract and high-skilled 
jobs regulated by service relationships. Whereas the former are easily monitored and do not require 
firm-specific training, the latter are characterised by a high level of autonomy and the need of exten-
sive firm-specific training. Thus, employers have an incentive to build up long-term commitments 
based on permanent contracts especially with higher-skilled classes. However, empirical evidence 
shows a more U-shaped pattern with higher risks for the higher service class as well as for unskilled 
workers (a.o. Buchholz and Kurz 2005).  
Overall, we expect our empirical analysis to confirm the findings of previous studies on determinants 
of temporary employment. However, the central question of this paper is whether or not these alloca-
tion mechanisms have changed over time. From a theoretical point of view there are reasons to 
believe so as there have been different macro-structural and macro-institutional changes that might 
have affected the individual risk patterns. These changes are discussed in the next two subsections.  
2.1 Structural changes  
Several macro-structural trends have been summarised under the heading of globalisation. According 
to Mills and Blossfeld (2005: 189), globalisation stands for four interrelated structural shifts that have 
transformed the life courses in modern societies during the last two decades: the internationalisation 
of markets, increasing economic competition due to general liberalisation, the transition to a 
knowledge society accelerated through the increased use of information and communication tech-
nologies; and the rising importance of markets and their international interdependence. These 
combined trends induce structural uncertainty because increasing dynamics and volatility make future 
predictions less precise.  
In the sociological literature there are two conflicting perspectives regarding the effects of increasing 
uncertainty on social inequality in the labour market. One assumption, that was put forward particularly 
                                                     
3  This argument is also in line with screening theory that expects that employers – due to incomplete 
information in the labour market – opt for temporary contracts as a form of prolonged probationary period 
especially for young persons (Riley 2001; Spence 1973). 
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by Beck (1992; 2000), relates global uncertainty to an individualisation of social inequalities. It is 
argued that existing determinants of social stratification like education and occupational classes will 
lose their importance for social inequality as new risks that are not related to these “classical” deter-
minants will emerge. These new risks will cross boundaries of educational and occupational classes 
thereby equalizing the distribution of labour market risks. Labour market insecurity will hit all occupa-
tional and educational classes, i.e. the new uncertainties have a levelling effect on all individuals, irre-
spective of their class or resources. Following these arguments educational level and occupational 
class will lose their importance as determinants of individual labour market chances. Thus, the asso-
ciation between the risk of having a temporary contract and educational titles/occupational class posi-
tions will weaken. If “classical” dimensions of social inequality lose much of their predictive power, 
other factors that might be unobserved in standard surveys, will gain in importance. From a statistical 
point of view, this should be reflected by a decreasing association of those “classical” determinants 
with labour market outcomes, which would, for example, be manifested in a decreased goodness of fit 
of such models of social inequality. At the same time residual variance in those models might 
increase. 
In contrast to the assumption of a growing individualisation of inequality, authors like Breen (1997) or 
Goldthorpe (2002) claim that the increasing uncertainty is shifted through pre-existing social inequali-
ties of power and resources. In this perspective, employers try to shift the risks stemming from market 
uncertainties to groups that already used to have a weak labour market position. Thus, traditional 
social inequality patterns, such as those based on educational resources and occupational class, are 
expected to persist or even to increase.  
With respect to flexible employment, Breen (1997) argues that employers try to transfer increased 
market risks stemming from growing markets volatilities to their employees (Breen calls this process a 
recommodification of risks4). Instead of developing long-term employment relationships, employers 
tend to use temporary employment contracts that guarantee the option to withdraw from employment 
contracts at any time. In this process, employees have to almost completely bear the increase in mar-
ket risks by facing a higher degree of uncertainty regarding future job stability. This creates a “contin-
gent asymmetric commitment” (Breen 1997: 477): employers can retain their workers when they are 
needed and get rid of them when they are no longer needed. However, even in times of high uncer-
tainty, it is rational for firms not to transform all employment relationships into short-term ones. 
Employers still have an incentive to build up long-term commitments, especially with high-educated 
persons and employees in higher-skilled occupations to keep a stable, experienced, and high-qualified 
core workforce. Those long-term commitments with high-qualified persons are important to maintain 
because it is in general difficult to monitor exactly what those workers are doing whereas tasks of low-
educated and unskilled workers can be closely supervised (Goldthorpe 1995). Thus, temporary con-
                                                     
4  “Recommodification” means the opposite of Esping-Anderson’s (1990) notion of “decommodification” where, 
for example, welfare regimes acted to “decommodify” individuals by seeking to make their life chances less 
dependent on market forces. 
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tracts are assumed to be particularly used for those jobs with low skill requirements.5 Then, the rela-
tive probability of getting a temporary contract will increase for low educated workers and lower occu-
pational classes compared to higher skilled workers.6 Mills and Blossfeld (2005) extend the argument 
of Breen (1997) to the dimension of age and expect that especially young persons as labour market 
outsiders are hit by increasing uncertainty compared to prime-age workers. Following this argument 
,young workers’ risk of holding a temporary contract will increase relative to the risks of other age 
groups.  
According to the foregoing line of reasoning increased uncertainty will foster social inequality along 
existing lines of social division. Thus, the impact of determinants such as age, educational titles and 
occupational class positions on the risk of holding a temporary contract can be expected to have 
increased. As these characteristics get more important for social inequality, unobserved factors are 
likely to get less important for the allocation process to temporary jobs. In statistical terms, this implies 
an increasing goodness of fit of models using “classical” determinants of social inequality, while resid-
ual variance in those models might have decreased.  
2.2 Institutional changes  
It is often argued that the effects of structural changes like globalisation or skill-biased technological 
change are mediated through the national institutional setting. Economists maintain that these 
changes translate into high levels of low-skilled unemployment in Europe because rigid labour market 
institutions prevent the necessary wage adjustments (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000; Blau and Kahn 
2002). In contrast, DiPrete et al. (2006) develop the sociological perspective that European labour 
markets have absorbed market uncertainties by allocating an increasingly large share of unskilled 
workers to flexible jobs.7 Following DiPrete et al. (2006), this trend has been induced by the deregula-
tion of the usage of temporary work contracts as a new tool for redistributing labour adjustment costs. 
They can confirm their hypothesis for the case of France that is characterised by a deregulation of the 
usage of temporary contracts. Since French employers were not able to reduce the relative wages of 
low educated workers, they instead increasingly concentrated low educated workers in temporary jobs 
with low-adjustment costs. DiPrete et al. interpret this trend as a direct consequence of the interaction 
between the eased use of flexible employment contracts and macro-structural changes.  
                                                     
5  This trend is probably strengthened by organizational/technical changes, like an increased bureaucratisation 
of economic organisation in modern societies and skill-biased technological change, that increase the relative 
demand for high skilled workers (Acemoglu 2002). Other structural changes like educational expansion might 
have also altered the skill-related inequality structure of temporary employment. However, educational 
expansion was very low in Germany in international comparison and even weakened within our period of 
observation (Müller and Wolbers 2003). Therefore, we do not expect any significant influences from 
educational expansion on the skill structure of temporary employment in Germany. 
6  According to Breen (1997), one can expect that certain groups like lower grade technicians and supervisors of 
manual workers have increasing risks because of organisational changes that ease monitoring, e.g. 
responsibility for profits to ever smaller units or performance targets. However, we can not differentiate these 
categories in our data. See section 3 for details. 
7  In contrast, in the US, uncertainties have been compensated by rising skill-based inequality of wages. 
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Similar predictions can also be derived for the case of Germany. While permanent contracts are still 
highly protected, the usage of temporary contracts has been successively facilitated in Germany 
(OECD 2004). For example, the 1985 Employment Promotion Act and later law changes in 1996, 
2001, and 2003 gradually extended the possibilities for temporary contracts by easing their application 
and renewals as well as prolonging their maximum duration (for details, see table A.1 in the appendix). 
This kind of partial labour market reform, with a relaxation of regulations against temporary employ-
ment but still high levels of protection of regular jobs, might be interpreted as an incentive for employ-
ers to increasingly use temporary contracts for employing low educated workers (Blanchard and 
Landier 2002; Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000).  
Unions are another labour market institution that might shape the distribution of individual risk of get-
ting a temporary contract. According to insider-outsider theory, unions represent collective interests of 
labour market insiders (Lindbeck and Snower 2002). Insiders, who have already gained permanent 
employment relationships in the (lower) primary labour market segment, have the strategy to prevent 
labour market outsiders from getting access to their privileged positions. In contrast, labour market 
outsiders, like young persons, are less represented in the negotiations of the social partners. There-
fore, one can conclude that the stronger the representation of insiders’ interests through unions, the 
lower is the chance for outsiders like young people to get permanent contracts. As unions’ power has 
weakened over time in Germany (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000), one can expect, ceteris paribus, a 
decreasing temporary employment risk for young workers.  
In sum, there are theoretical arguments predicting weakening explanatory power of existing patterns 
of social inequality, particularly for such determinants as educational level and occupational position. 
Contrary to these arguments, there are predictions about a strengthening of social inequality along 
existing lines of social division. It is important to note that both lines of argumentation assume the ex-
pected shifts in the mechanisms in the process of allocating people to temporary jobs to result from 
macro-structural and macro-institutional changes. Unfortunately, the research design of this paper 
does not allow to fully disentangle the different macro-level influences. However, given the data it is at 
least possible to analyse the joint effects of these changes. Thus, the overall impact of macro-level 
changes on the allocation process to temporary employment relationships can be studied.   
3 Research design 
3.1 Data  
For the empirical analysis we use data from German Labour Force Survey (Mikrozensus), covering 
the period from 1989 to 2005. This database provides standardised, cross-sectional information on 
individuals regarding labour force participation, employment characteristics, gender, age, education, 
occupational status, and employment history, among others. The sample size of the scientific use file 
corresponds to a random sample of 0.7 percent of the population residing in Germany containing more 
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than 500,000 observations for a given year. Compared to other micro datasets like the German Socio-
Economic Panel, the Mikrozensus thus has the advantage of a large number of highly reliable obser-
vations. We restrict the sample to employees aged 16-65 who do not longer participate in education, 
i.e. we exclude students and apprentices. The analysis is limited to the time period 1989 to 2005 as 
the central information on contract status is missing prior to 1989. Unfortunately, we cannot use the 
Mikrozensus waves from 1990, 1992 and 1994, because these waves are not available for research. 
Since important information on job characteristics (such as firm size or occupational class) is not 
available in the data before 1996, the analyses of this paper are limited to the period 1996 to 2005 
whenever job characteristics are investigated.8 Furthermore, we decided to restrict the analyses to the 
West-German labour market. Given the radical transformation process of the East-German labour 
market since 1990, a separate analysis would be necessary, which – interesting as it may be – would 
certainly go far beyond the scope of the paper.9  
3.2 Variables 
The central variable defining the type of employment contract is a binary indicator, coded 1 for tempo-
rary contracts and 0 in case of a permanent contract. Temporary employment is characterised by the 
agreement between employer and employee on objective conditions under which a job ends, such as 
a specific date, the completion of a task or the return of another employee who has been temporarily 
replaced. In particular, this applies to fixed-term contracts, workers with a contract for a specific task, 
occasional, casual or seasonal workers, as well as to some temporary agency workers. 
The set of explanatory variables reflecting the determinants of the type of an employment contract 
contain individual and structural characteristics (for details see table A.2). As standard individual vari-
ables we include gender, nationality, age and education. Gender10 and nationality are dummy-coded 
whereas age is grouped in ten-years intervals (16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, and 56-65 years). To con-
trol for differences in educational attainment, we use information on the successful completion of 
different general and vocational educational levels which allow defining educational degrees according 
to the CASMIN classifications (Lechert, Schroedter and Lüttinger 2006). CASMIN has the advantage 
of combining information on the highest school degree and the highest vocational degree. This is 
especially relevant for the highly standardised and stratified German educational system with its high 
                                                     
8  Moreover, until 2005 standard occupational classifications (as for example ISCO) that are needed to code a 
person's occupational class is only available for the 0.45 percent subsample of the Mikrozensus. Thus, the 
sample size is reduced by more than half whenever this information is used in a statistical model. In order to 
have similar sample sizes, we draw a 45 percent subsample of the 2005 wave if we estimate models that 
include occupational information. 
9  The Mikrozensus does not allow identifying those persons who are registered in job-creation measures (the 
so-called “Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen”), which are temporary by definition. While those specific 
employment forms are important for the East German labour market, they are rather marginal for West 
Germany (Rudolph 2000). 
10  For the sake of brevity, we only present results from models that were estimated for both men and women 
simultaneously. This is justified by the fact that taking into account gender-specific risk patterns by estimating 
separate models for men and women does not substantially alter our results. The results of these separate 
analyses are available on request from the authors. 
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degree of vocational specificity (Müller and Shavit 1998). The CASMIN categories have been summa-
rised into six categories: elementary education (CASMIN 1a, 1b), elementary education with voca-
tional training (CASMIN 1c), intermediate/higher secondary education without vocational training 
(CASMIN 2b, 2cgen), intermediate/higher secondary education with vocational training (CASMIN 2a, 
2cvoc), higher technical college (CASMIN 3a), and university education (CASMIN 3b). Recent labour 
market history is approximated by the activity status one year prior to the survey. This variable differ-
entiates between employment, unemployment, inactivity, and participation in education. 
We also control for structural influences in the form of firm size and industry sector of employer. Firm 
size is differentiated in three groups: small firms (1-10 employees), medium-sized firms (11-50 
employees) and large firms (more than 50 employees). Industry sector is measured according to nine 
aggregated NACE classification (see table A.2). Information on employment status in the public 
service is combined with the NACE classification as an additional sector category. All persons working 
in the public sector are coded into this additional category that is independent of their NACE classifi-
cation. Occupational class differences are captured according to an aggregated version of Erikson and 
Goldthorpe’s (1992) class scheme. The scheme differentiates between higher service (EGP I), lower 
service (EGP II), routine clerical (EGP IIIa), routine service/sales (EGP IIIb), skilled manual (EGP VI), 
and semi-/unskilled workers and agricultural workers (EGP VII). We derive EGP classes from ISCO-88 
coded occupational titles following the procedure of Ganzeboom and Treiman (2003). However, we 
cannot fully implement the transformation due to data limitations of the Mikrozensus. For example, 
EGP V class of manual supervisors is missing because information about the supervisory status are 
lacking in the Mikrozensus. Self-employed persons are excluded by our sample selection definition. 
3.3 Statistical methods 
In order to analyse changes in the inequality structure of temporary employment we estimated bino-
mial logistic regressions where the binary indicator of having a temporary contract is regressed on a 
set of explanatory variables as outlined above. These regressions are estimated for each year sepa-
rately, thereby allowing us to compare logit regression coefficients over time.  A simple strategy to 
investigate overall changes in the determinants of temporary employment over time is to compare 
measures of goodness of fit. Whereas in linear regressions the coefficient of determination R² is the 
standard concept, there is a huge variety of measures of goodness of fit for logistic regressions (Long 
1997; Long and Freese 2006). Therefore, we choose the strategy to compare two distinct measures of 
goodness of fit in terms of a sensitivity analysis. First, we use a measure based on the concept of 
Pseudo-R². The most popular Pseudo-R² is McFadden’s R² that is defined as 
0
2 1
LL
LLR M−=   (1) 
where MLL  is the likelihood of the full model and 0LL  is the likelihood of the constant-only model. 
However, it should be noted that this is only one specific calculation of Pseudo-R² out of a wide range 
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of possible measures (for a discussion see Long 1997: 102-113). Second, a different approach of 
assessing the fit of a model and for comparing models over time is based on Bayesian measures of 
information. For our analysis we use Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) that is defined as  
N
PLLAIC M 22 +−=  (2) 
where P is the number of parameters in the model, and N is the number of observation. The model 
with the smaller AIC is considered the better fitting model. Unlike McFadden’s Pseudo-R² information 
measures such as the AIC have penalties for including variables that do not significantly improve the 
fit. 11  
Finally, we implement two models that test for changes in the effect of age, education, and occupa-
tional class assuming a linear time trend. These models are estimated using the pooled Mikrozensus 
data. While one of these models is a standard logit model, the other is a heterogeneous choice model 
that takes into account changes in residual variance over time. Besides explicitly modelling a time-
dependent residual variance, this model allows to counter potential bias stemming from heteroscedas-
ticity (i.e. varying residual variance) in standard logit models. Whereas in the context of ordinary least 
squares regression heteroskedasticity does not bias the parameter estimates, this causes more prob-
lems in logit regressions. In case of varying variances of the error term, not only are the standard 
errors incorrect, but the parameters are also biased and inconsistent. In order to deal with these 
problems, heterogeneous choice model for logit model have been developed (Alvarez and Brehm 
1995; Keele and Park 2006). Deriving the binary choice model in a latent variable framework (e.g. 
Wooldridge 2002), we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )βεεβ iiiiii XXYY ≤=>+=>== ∗ Pr0Pr0Pr1Pr   (3) 
where iY  is the observed binary indicator and 
∗
iY  represents the latent variable that depends on 
explanatory variables iX  and an error component iε . In the logit case this error term is assumed to 
follow a logistic distribution Λ . To estimate the standard logit model, it must be assumed that the error 
term is homoskedastic or constant such that 
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛Λ=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ≤== σ
β
σ
β
σ
ε iii
i
XXY Pr1Pr   (4) 
The regression parameters will estimate the true coefficients only up to scale ( )σββ =ˆ . Thus, if the 
assumption of a constant error variance is violated, for example because the error variance changes 
over time, than the parameter estimates will be biased. Accordingly, comparing logit coefficients 
across groups or time is invalid and misleading if residual variance varies (Allison 1999). For the 
                                                     
11  We do not present results for other Pseudo-R² or information criteria because they do not alter the results in a 
significant way. 
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analyses of this paper the results from standard logit models might suggest that estimated logit coeffi-
cients have changed although the true coefficients remained stable but the residual variance changed 
over time. It is even possible that estimated coefficients remain stable over time although the true val-
ues have changed (and vice versa) and this has been countervailed by changing residual variation. In 
contrast to standard logit models, heterogeneous choice models assume that the error variance varies 
systematically (for an overview, see Keele and Park 2006; Williams 2007). The variance component in 
heterogeneous choice models is modelled parametrically as   
( ) ( ) 22var expi i iZε σ γ= = ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   (5) 
where iZ are variables that explain the changing variance. The iZ ’s and iX ’s need not to include 
any of the same variables, although they can. Then, the changed probability distribution is written as 
( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛Λ== γ
β
i
i
i Z
XY
exp
1Pr   (6) 
Maximizing the log likelihood of the heteroscedastic logit model will produce unbiased and consistent 
estimates of the true coefficients β  if the residual variance equation (5) is well specified.12 
                                                     
12  For a detailed discussion of the model’s statistical properties see Keele and Park (2006). 
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4  Empirical results 
The empirical section of the paper is divided into two parts. The first subsection provides a brief 
overview of the development of temporary employment in the West German labour market during the 
last decades. Furthermore, shares of temporary employment for different age groups, educational 
levels and occupational classes are presented in order to cast a first glance at the distribution of 
temporary jobs across these social groups. This very descriptive section complements the second part 
which discusses the results of models that simultaneously relate the risk of holding a temporary 
contract to characteristics of the worker as well as to features of the job. These models are intended to 
provide statistically robust tests on the changing impact of “classical” determinants of temporary 
employment.   
4.1 Some stylised facts on temporary employment in West Germany 
This first descriptive section provides some stylised facts on the development and structure of tempo-
rary employment in West Germany. Table 1 presents the overall share of temporary employment of 
selected years in the period 1989-2005. Furthermore, group-specific shares for certain demographical 
and educational groups as well as occupational classes are reported. Due to the cross-sectional 
design of the Mikrozensus, the shares refer to the stock of temporary workers recorded on a reference 
day, rather than on the total number of employment contracts in force during a particular year.  
Table 1 shows that the share of temporary workers has remained fairly constant during the 1990s 
varying in the 5 to 6 per cent interval. After 1989, there was a slight decrease to a share of 5.2 percent 
in 1993 when the post-unification boom ended, whereas the share increased again to 6.2 percent in 
2001. In the new millennium, the slight upward trend continued and reached a maximum of 7.3 per-
cent in 2005. Overall, these figures suggest that the changes in the regulation of the use of temporary 
contracts (see table A1 in the appendix) did not lead to a massive increase in the shares of this type of 
employment. Obviously, German employers gain flexibility not only by employing their staff on a tem-
porary basis. However, looking at the group-specific shares of temporary jobs, it becomes clear that 
labour market flexibilisation did not affect the work force in a universal way, but rather mainly hit those 
labour market groups whose positioning was already weak.  
With respect to the risk differentials between age groups, the findings displayed in table 1 confirm the 
results of previous research: The risk of holding a temporary contract is highest for young workers and 
lowest for older employees. Comparing these differentials over time reveals a strong increase of the 
age-related inequality in the risk of being temporarily employed. As can be seen from table 1, the risk 
of holding a temporary contract for persons aged between 16 and 25 more than doubled during the 
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observation period and reached a rather high level of 24.7 percent in 2005.13 Given the relatively con-
stant overall share, this implies that the relative risk has increased substantially for young persons.  
Table 1: Risk of temporary employment by selected demographic and educational groups  
(in percentages) 
  1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 
All 5.6 5.2 5.4 6.2 7.3 
      
Age      
16-25 years 11.4 13.8 14.7 18.1 24.7 
26-35 years 7.0 5.9 7.1 7.9 10.6 
36-45 years 3.4 3.3 3.9 4.7 5.5 
46-55 years 2.8 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.3 
56-65 years 2.9 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.2 
      
Education      
Elementary 5.7 4.8 5.7 7.2 8.5 
Elementary + voc 3.8 3.3 3.4 4.1 5.1 
Intermediate/full secondary 15.4 16.7 12.0 12.4 13.7 
Intermediate/full secondary + voc 5.5 4.8 4.7 5.2 6.6 
Higher technical  college 5.3 3.7 5.4 5.3 6.3 
University 12.3 11.0 12.4 12.4 12.0 
      
Occupational Classa)      
Higher service   9.4 8.9 9.6 
Lower service   4.6 5.2 5.7 
Routine clerical   4.7 5.5 6.4 
Routine service and sales   4.6 5.8 7.1 
Skilled manuals   3.5 4.1 5.8 
Semi- and unskilled manuals   5.4 6.4 7.7 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Mikrozensus 1989-2005 data. 
Remark: a) information on occupational class were not available in the data before 1996 (see section 3.1)  
There is also a significant variation in temporary employment shares across educational groups. Inter-
estingly, there are only small differences between the primary, secondary and tertiary educational 
level. However, at all educational levels holders of vocational qualification certificates are less likely to 
be temporarily employed. For example, the temporary employment share for persons with intermedi-
ate or full secondary education without vocational qualification is about three times larger than the 
share of those with vocational qualification. At the tertiary level, the proportion of university degree 
holders with temporary jobs is twice as high as the corresponding proportion of graduates from higher 
technical colleges, which are more vocationally oriented. The positive vocational effect also exists on 
the primary level, but it is less pronounced. These findings are in line with those from previous 
research. Regarding time trends, we find that – starting in the mid 1990s – at the primary level both 
persons with vocational and general education faced an increasing risk of holding a temporary con-
                                                     
13  It should be noted that we excluded apprentices from our analysis. Thus, the share of temporary jobs does not 
simply reflect the higher proportion of apprentices holding temporary contracts in the age group 16-25 years.  
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tract. At the same time, the corresponding risk for general educated persons on the secondary and 
tertiary level decreased slightly. While this implies a convergence in education-related temporary 
employment risks, it is the labour market position of those with low qualification that has worsened 
during the last ten years. 
Level differences are less pronounced along the occupational class dimension. It turns out that occu-
pational positions belonging to the higher service class are on average more likely than other positions 
to be connected to temporary jobs. Detailed inspections on the occupational level (not shown) reveal 
that this higher incidence of temporary jobs is especially due to professionals within the higher service 
class. Furthermore, besides positions of the higher service class, those of the semi- and unskilled 
manual class are more likely than others equipped with temporary contract. This U-shaped risk pat-
tern, which was also found by previous research (a.o. Buchholz and Kurz 2005), is somewhat at odds 
with the idea that employment contracts are different for occupation of the service class and those of 
the manual classes (Goldthorpe 2000). The discrepancy between the higher service class and other 
occupational classes vanished slightly during the observation period because all other classes regis-
tered an increasing risk of holding a temporary contract. However, the increase is particularly pro-
nounced for the lower occupational classes, which indicates growing labour market risks for workers in 
those occupational positions.  
In sum, we can confirm the social risk patterns of temporary employment that have been found in the 
existing literature: Young persons, holders of more generally oriented educational certificates, and 
employees of the higher service/the semi- and unskilled manual class face higher risks of holding a 
temporary contract when compared to other social groups. Regarding descriptive time trends, we find 
that the risk of holding a temporary contract seems to have increased across the age dimension. This 
is in line with the prediction of Mills and Blossfeld (2005) that extends the argument of Breen (1997) to 
young persons and expect that especially young persons as labour market outsiders are hit by in-
creasing uncertainty. We can also confirm the prediction of DiPrete et al. (2006) who argue that Euro-
pean labour markets have absorbed market uncertainties by allocating an increasingly large share of 
unskilled workers to flexible jobs. As the risk of holding a temporary contract increased for workers 
with lower education and from lower social classes, these groups lost much of their relative advantage 
against workers holding a university degree and those from the higher service class, respectively, who 
used to face the highest risks of holding a temporary job. Overall, the results of the descriptive analy-
sis suggest that social inequality is increasing along existing lines of social division. Though this most 
clearly holds for the age division of temporary employment risks, inequality patterns across educa-
tional groups and occupational classes have changed in such a way that the risks have increased for 
weak labour market groups. 
4.2 Changing risk patterns of temporary employment? 
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we investigate the determinants of temporary employment 
at the individual level. We start with binominal logit models estimated separately for each year in the 
period from 1989 to 2005. Since some explanatory variables, like occupational class, firm size or last 
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year activity, are missing in the period from 1989 to 1995 (see section 3.1), we estimated, in a first 
step, a basic specification with education, age, gender and nationality as explanatory variables for the 
period 1989 to 2005.14 
The age-specific risk of holding a temporary contract is shown in Figure 1. In line with the existing 
empirical evidence, we can confirm the general pattern that the older the person the lower her risk of 
holding a temporary contract. Especially the youngest age group has a significantly higher risk of 
holding a temporary contract compared to all other age groups. Thus, young workers lacking work 
experience, seniority, and networks are more likely to find themselves in temporary jobs than in per-
manent ones. The size of the logit coefficients presented in Figure 1 has no direct clear interpretation, 
but they can easily be transformed into odds ratios. For example the logit coefficient of 2.42 for per-
sons aged 16 to 25 in 2005 implies an odds ratio of 11.45 ( )2.42e  indicating that their risk of holding a 
temporary instead of a permanent contract is about eleven times as much as the risk faced by persons 
aged 56 to 65. 
Figure 1: Logit coefficients for age groups, basic specification 1989-2005 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Mikrozensus 1989-2005 data. 
Remark: Oldest age group (56-65) represents the reference group. 
                                                     
14  Logit coefficients are derived from standard logistic regression that rest on the assumption of a time-constant 
residual variation (see section 3.3 for more details). Since the estimated coefficients do not substantially differ 
from those obtained from heteroscedastic choice models, which explicitly take into account changes in 
residual variation over time, we present results from the standard logit models only. Furthermore, only the 
coefficients of age, education, and class are shown as these variables are of key interest in this paper. 
Detailed estimation results are available upon request. 
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With respect to the changes in the impact of age on the probability of being temporarily employed, the 
results clearly indicate that age differentials increased over time. For example, the logit coefficient for 
the age group 16-25 increased from 1.69 to 2.42, which corresponds to an increase in the odds-ratio 
from 5.42 to 11.45. Thus, there is a strengthening of the association between temporary employment 
and age. This finding is in line with the descriptive evidence and it is valid even after controlling for a 
set of demographic characteristics. This confirms the predictions of Mills and Blossfeld (2005) and 
contradicts the idea that a weakening of unions’ power has decreased the insider-outsider cleavages.  
Figure 2 displays the logit coefficients for different educational groups where university education is 
the reference category.15 The results indicate that – after controlling for basic demographic 
characteristics – when compared to workers holding university degrees all other educational groups 
face a lower risk of holding a temporary. This is especially the case for people with intermediate/full 
secondary education combined vocational training as well as individuals with elementary education 
combined with vocational training. But also graduates from higher technical college and even workers 
holding only elementary certificates face a lower risk of holding a temporary contract when compared 
to university graduates. For example, the logit coefficient of -1.041 for persons with elementary educa-
tion and vocational training in 2005 implies an odds ratio of 0.353 ( )-1.041e  indicating that their risk of 
holding a temporary instead of a permanent contract is about one third as much as the risk faced by 
persons with university education. These results underline the findings of the descriptive analysis: The 
level of education does not seem to matter much for the risk of holding a temporary job. Rather it is 
the completion of vocational training that matters, which is in line with the results of previous studies 
(a.o. Giesecke 2006; Giesecke and Groß 2003).  
Regarding the trend of coefficients over time, one can detect a convergence in education related tem-
porary employment risks. Especially those with elementary education (without and with vocational 
training) and those with intermediate/full secondary education with vocational training faced an in-
creasing risk and lost much of their relative advantage compared to persons with university education. 
As in the descriptive analysis, the evidence from the multivariate analysis confirms the general predic-
tion of DiPrete et al. (2006) who argue that European labour markets have absorbed market uncertain-
ties by allocating an increasingly large share of low-educated workers to flexible jobs. Our findings 
clearly suggest an increasing risk for low educated workers in Germany as DiPrete et al. (2006) have 
found it for France. The difference is, however, that in Germany university graduates face the highest 
relative risk of holding a temporary contract. Therefore, the increasing risk for low educated workers 
translates into a convergence in education related temporary employment risks in Germany. In con-
trast, in France, university graduates face a lower relative risk of holding a temporary job. Thus, in the 
French labour market the increasing risk for low educated workers translates into increasing education 
differentials in temporary employment risks. 
                                                     
15  Because in this specification all variables that might be an outcome of education (e.g. firm size or occupational 
class) are excluded, we evaluate possible changes in the gross effect of education on the risk of holding a 
temporary contract.  
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Figure 2: Logit coefficients for educational groups, basic specification 1989-2005 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Mikrozensus 1989-2005 data. 
Remark: University education represents the reference group. 
Given these results, the question arises to what extent the weakening education differentials and the 
strengthening age differentials have affected the overall nexus of the “classical” determinants and 
temporary employment. In order to assess the predictive power of our baseline specification, we com-
pare two measures of goodness of fit, Pseudo-R² and AIC. To assure comparability of measures of 
goodness of fit over time we repeated the analysis from above but drew a random sample with a size 
of 50,000 persons for each year. The results of these calculations are displayed in Figure 3. As can be 
seen from figure 3 there is no clear evidence of a decreasing or an increasing association of the 
individual characteristics used in the model and the risk of holding a temporary contract. Looking at 
the Pseudo-R² measure, the association of the individual characteristics and temporary employment 
seems to have slightly increased between 1989 and 2005. In contrast, the development of AIC sug-
gests a slight decrease of the model fit. Thus, the measures of fit do not provide clear-cut results 
regarding changes in the predictive power of the basic model specification. 
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Figure 3: Measures of goodness of fit: Pseudo-R² and AIC, basic specification 1989-2005 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Mikrozensus 1989-2005 data. 
Remark: Random samples of size 50,000 drawn for each year to assure comparability of measures of goodness 
of fit over time. 
In a second step we estimated logit models that, in addition to individual characteristics, contained 
information about structural features as firm size, industry sector and occupational class as well as last 
year activity. Since the latter variables are only available from 1996 onwards, the observational period 
is shortened to ten years. The contribution of these models is twofold. First, they investigate the 
impact of structural characteristics on the risk of holding a temporary contract which is estimated net of 
the effects of job holders’ individual characteristics. Thus, in contrast to the descriptive analysis it is 
possible to evaluate that part of the association of occupational class and temporary employment that 
is not due to the specific composition of the occupational classes (e.g. between-class differences in 
workers’ average age or educational level) but to the specific structural characteristics of these posi-
tions. Secondly, by looking at measures of model fit it can be investigated whether or not the impor-
tance of structural factors in the allocation process to temporary jobs has changed over time.       
Based on the full model specification, Figure 4 displays the estimated effects of occupational class on 
the risk of holding a temporary contract. The results indicate that compared to the reference group of 
higher service class positions occupational positions of all other classes exhibit lower shares of tempo-
rary jobs. This finding is similar to the results of the descriptive analysis. However, in contrast to these 
results, the multivariate analysis reveals that net of job holders’ individual characteristics the risk of 
semi- and unskilled manual workers is not always higher than that of workers from other lower 
classes. At the same time positions of the lower service class seem to be least likely connected to 
temporary contracts. This higher chance of holding a permanent contract corresponds with the theo-
retical perspective, arguing that employers prefer permanent contracts to build up long-term employ-
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ment relationships in order to keep a stable, experienced, and high-qualified core workforce. The high 
relative risk of occupational positions of the higher service class, which is not in line with this 
argument, can be mainly attributed to the disproportionately high risk of professionals, while 
managerial positions have a risk of being temporary that is comparable to that of other occupational 
classes (detailed analysis not shown).  
With respect to changes in the effects of occupational class over time figure 4, does not provide evi-
dence in favour of the assumption of an increasing risk of lower class positions. Though there is a 
slight convergence of the risk of holding a temporary contract between classes in the last two years, 
for the whole observational period there exists hardly any clear-cut time trend in the estimated effects 
of the occupational classes: Over the ten-year observational period occupational class related ine-
quality structures show trendless fluctuations. This implies that despite structural and institutional 
changes during that time, there has been no increasing risk for workers of lower occupational classes 
to be employed in temporary jobs. Thus, these results contradict the predictions of Breen (1997), 
according to which the lower classes will be increasingly exposed to flexible employment relationships. 
Comparing these findings with those from the descriptive analysis reveals that the reported increase in 
the share of temporary jobs in lower occupational classes results mainly from the specific composition 
of these classes (i.e. higher shares of young and less educated workers) than from shifts in the risk 
differentials between occupational positions per se.  
Figure 4: Logit coefficients for EGP classes, full specification 1996-2005 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Mikrozensus 1996-2005 data. 
Remark: Higher service class (EGP I) represent the reference group. 
The previous argument is underlined by looking at the effects of age and education in the full model 
specification (see table A.3 in the appendix for detailed information). Both age- and education-specific 
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risks of holding a temporary contract show the same order and time trends as in the case of the basic 
specification. This result implies that even after taking into account job-related factors such as firm 
size, industry sector and occupational class, the youngest age cohort as well as low educated workers 
are confronted with an increasing risk of getting a temporary contract.  
In a next analytical step, the overall importance of individual and job-related characteristics for the 
process of allocating people to temporary employment relationships is evaluated. Again, the evalua-
tion of the full model’s predictive power is done by comparing the values of two different measures of 
goodness of fit (Pseudo-R² and AIC) over time.16 As can be seen from figure 5, both measures 
indicate a slight decrease of the variables’ ability to predict a person’s type of contract, albeit this trend 
is more pronounced for AIC than for Pseudo-R². This might be interpreted as a reduction of the 
importance of “classical” determinants of temporary employment, though the empirical evidence is far 
from being conclusive.  
Figure 5: Measures of goodness of fit: Pseudo-R² and AIC, full specification 1996-2005 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Mikrozensus 1996-2005 data. 
Remark: Random samples of size 50,000 drawn for each year to assure comparability of measures of goodness 
of fit over time. 
In the last step of our analysis we estimated both a heterogeneous choice model and a standard logit 
model for the full model specification using the pooled data from 1996 to 2005. Estimating these mod-
els serves two purposes. First, the heterogeneous choice model allows one to specify and test 
changes in the residual variation. From theoretical reasoning the predictions about the way residual 
variation might have changed over time were not univocal. Empirically, the findings of the last subsec-
                                                     
16  As in the analysis of the basic model specification, we drew random samples of equal size of 50,000 persons 
for each year in order to assure comparability of measures of goodness of fit over time. 
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tion suggest a slight decrease of the model fit over time, which might indicate an increase of residual 
variation. In order to test for changes in the residual variance, component we specified a heteroge-
neous choice model using a general linear time trend, i.e. residual variation is modelled as 
( ) ( ) 2var expit tε γ= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . As discussed in the section on statistical methods (3.3), an increase in the 
residual variation leads to a downward bias of the coefficients estimated in standard logit models and 
vice versa. Thus, the amount of temporal change in the impact of “classical” determinants on the like-
lihood of holding a temporary job might be overestimated in such models. Second, by pooling the 
data, we are able to conveniently test for time trends in the effects of age, education, and occupational 
class on the risk of holding a temporary contract. Up to this point, the temporal changes in these 
effects were discussed without referring to the question of statistical significance of the reported 
changes. In order to account for a time-varying impact of the observed characteristics on the risk of 
holding a temporary contract, all explanatory variables in the model are interacted with a linear time 
trend.17 Using this model specification, we are able to provide proper statistical tests on the empirical 
findings on changing allocation patterns discussed so far. In order to check the robustness of our 
results, we compare the estimates of a heterogeneous choice model with those of a corresponding 
standard logit model that neglects the issue of non-constant residual variation. Table 2 reports the 
estimation results of these models.18  
Looking at the results displayed in Table 2, there are two points that should be particularly stressed 
here. First, with respect to the time trend in the residual variation, which is explicitly modelled in the 
heterogeneous choice model, it becomes obvious that residual variation has slightly increased over 
time at a rate of about one percent per year. However, this time trend is far from being statistically 
significant. This insignificance is also reflected in the values of the log likelihood that show no sub-
stantial improvement when comparing the heterogeneous choice model to the standard logit model 
which assumes a constant error variance. Thus, the data clearly rejects the assumption that the varia-
tion of unobserved factors of the risk of holding a temporary contract has increased over time. In sta-
tistical terms this result implies that the estimates of the standard logit model do not suffer from bias 
stemming from non-constant residual variation. This is reflected by the fact that, when comparing the 
two models, most of the estimated coefficients for the variables and their interactions with the time 
trend are quite similar. The major difference between the two models can be found in the sharply 
decreased t-values of those coefficients capturing time trends. This particularly holds for the estimated 
time trends of the educational groups, which are estimated with a higher degree of uncertainty in the 
heterogeneous choice model. Thus, the decrease in t-values is mainly due to inflated standard errors 
in the heterogeneous choice model. Given this difference and the finding of an insignificant time trend 
in the residual variation, we rely on the results of the standard logit model.19 
                                                     
17  In addition to these interaction terms, a general linear time trend is incorporated to account for a general 
increase in the risk of temporary contracts.  
18  To ease convergence of the complex heteroscedastic choice model, we draw random samples of equal size of 
50,000 persons for each year. 
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Table 2: Comparison of pooled logit and heterogeneous choice model, full specification 1996-
2005 
  pooled logit   heterogeneous choice 
  coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat 
Time trend t 0.03** (2.01) -0.02 (-0.32) 
     
Age group (Ref. 56-65)    
age 16-25 1.70*** (27.83) 1.69*** (25.91) 
t*age 16-25 0.05*** (4.60) 0.08** (2.08) 
age 26-35 1.09*** (19.26) 1.09*** (18.68) 
t*age 26-35 -0.00 (-0.04) 0.02 (0.70) 
age 36-45 0.58*** (9.93) 0.57*** (9.60) 
t*age 36-45 0.00 (0.16) 0.01 (0.68) 
age 46-55 0.13** (2.09) 0.13** (2.05) 
t*age 46-55 -0.01 (-1.21) -0.01 (-1.10) 
     
Education (Ref. university)    
elementary -0.85*** (-15.88) -0.86*** (-15.51) 
t*elementary 0.03*** (3.03) 0.02 (1.46) 
elementary + voc -1.12*** (-23.48) -1.12*** (-22.92) 
t*elementary + voc 0.03*** (3.49) 0.02 (1.03) 
intermediate/full secondary -0.46*** (-8.02) -0.47*** (-7.83) 
t*intermediate/full secondary 0.00 (0.47) -0.00 (-0.07) 
intermediate/full secondary + voc -1.22*** (-27.82) -1.22*** (-27.13) 
t*intermediate/full secondary + voc 0.04*** (4.89) 0.03 (1.47) 
higher technical college -0.96*** (-17.26) -0.96*** (-16.86) 
t*higher technical college 0.02* (1.72) 0.01 (0.38) 
     
Occupational class (Ref. higher service (I))  
lower service (II) -0.57*** (-13.03) -0.57*** (-12.69) 
t* lower service (II) 0.00 (0.06) -0.01 (-0.58) 
routine clericals (IIIa) -0.43*** (-8.19) -0.43*** (-7.99) 
t* routine clericals (IIIa) 0.00 (0.26) -0.00 (-0.26) 
routine service/sales (IIIb) -0.30*** (-5.71) -0.30*** (-5.56) 
t*routine service/sales (IIIb) 0.01 (0.90) 0.01 (0.47) 
skilled manual (VI) -0.38*** (-6.88) -0.38*** (-6.66) 
t* skilled manual (VI) -0.00 (-0.08) -0.01 (-0.52) 
semi-/unskilled manuals (VII) -0.25*** (-5.09) -0.26***    (-4.98) 
t* semi-/unskilled manual (VII) -0.00 (-0.16) -0.00 (-0.46) 
Constant -3.26*** (-45.43) 3.26*** (44.21) 
    
Residual variation ( )2ln σ      
Time trend t   0.01 (0.88) 
     
Log Likelihood -102969.9  -102969.5  
N 571017   571017   
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Mikrozensus 1996-2005 data. 
Remark: Only selected coefficients are reported. In addition to these variables, the full specification contains 
information on activity status last year, gender, nationality, firm size, sector, and interactions with time for each 
variable. 
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With19respect to the time trends in the effects of age, education, and occupational class, the results of 
the model using the pooled data confirm the findings of the previous subsections. As can be seen form 
Table 2, the risk of holding a temporary job is highest for the youngest age group. This risk has 
increased at a rate of 0.05 logit points, which corresponds to a 5 percent increase in the odds-ratio, 
per year. Thus age-differentials have clearly widened over the observational period. Regarding the 
educational level, the results reveal that almost all educational groups experienced an increasing risk 
of holding a temporary contract. This particularly holds for the elementary level as well as for the level 
of intermediate/full secondary education with vocational training. On the one hand, these results sug-
gest that there has been a convergence in education related temporary employment differentials. On 
the other hand, this convergence implies a worsening of the labour market position of those workers 
holding degrees below the tertiary level. Finally, with respect to the impact of occupational class on the 
risk of holding a temporary contract, the results indicate no change in the effect of occupational class 
over time. This implies that the increase in class-specific shares of temporary employment found in the 
descriptive analysis above is solely due to the composition of these classes with respect to workers’ 
individual and job-related characteristics.      
5 Conclusion 
Previous research on temporary employment relationships has revealed that this type of employment 
is related to serious socio-economic disadvantages – lower wages and higher unemployment risks of 
workers holding temporary contracts being only two examples for these disadvantages. At the same 
time these inferior labour market positions are not equally distributed across the work force as char-
acteristics like age, education, and occupational class have been shown to be important determinants 
for an individual’s probability of holding a temporary instead of a permanent contract. Whereas these 
allocation patterns are well documented by empirical studies, there is only little research on the ques-
tion if and to what extent these patterns have changed over time. However, given the substantial 
structural and institutional changes that affected the German labour market during the last two dec-
ades, there are reasons to believe that risk patterns related to temporary jobs and thus the contours of 
social inequality itself have changed.  
Based on data from the German Mikrozensus for the years 1989-2005, our empirical results indeed 
indicate that there have been changes both in the overall incidence of temporary contracts and in the 
specific risk of certain labour market groups to hold such a contract. On the aggregate level there has 
been only a modest increase in the overall share of temporary employment in the West German 
labour market over the last 20 years, which is an interesting result given the significant relaxation of 
regulations against the use of temporary employment during this time period. Obviously, the demand 
for this type of employment relations and thus the demand for higher external flexibility seems to be 
                                                     
19  It should be stressed here, that it is important to consider heteroscedastic choice models as part of those 
analyses that compare logit coefficients over time. Only if heterogeneous choice model show no significant 
changes in residual variation, as in our case, the use of conventional logit analyses is justified. 
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lower than thought by some commentators who refer to the level of employment protection as one of 
the main structural problems of the German labour market (Siebert 1997). 
However, while the overall share of temporary jobs has only slightly increased, there clearly have 
been shifts in the risk of holding a temporary contract for certain social groups relative to other labour 
market groups. In particular, the results indicate that young persons as labour market outsiders faced 
an increasing risk of getting a temporary contract. In the observational period, the share of young per-
sons aged 16-25 holding a temporary contract almost doubled, reaching about 25 percent in 2005. 
This result holds even after controlling for other individual and job characteristics. Thus, inequality in 
the distribution of temporary employment seems to have substantially deepened across the age 
dimension. This is in line with the predictions of Mills and Blossfeld (2005) who argue that young per-
sons as labour market outsiders are particularly hit by increasing market uncertainties.  
In addition to the strengthening inequality across age groups, the results reveal changes in the educa-
tion-related inequality patterns. Especially those with elementary education (without and with voca-
tional training) and those with intermediate/full secondary education with vocational training faced an 
increasing risk of holding a temporary job and lost much of their relative advantage when compared to 
persons with university education. This confirms the general predictions of DiPrete et al. (2006) who 
argue that European labour markets have absorbed market uncertainties by allocating an increasingly 
large share of low-educated workers to flexible jobs.  
Overall, the empirical analysis revealed that particularly those individuals were increasingly allocated 
to inferior employment relations who belong to groups that already have had a weak labour market 
position – the young and the low educated. In addition, while the impact of these “classical” determi-
nants shaped social inequality in the described way, there are no signs of a growing importance of 
other (typically unobserved) characteristics that determine an individual’s risk of holding a temporary 
contract (such as ability or motivation). Thus, these findings provide evidence of a strengthening of 
social inequality along the existing lines of social division and reject the notion of an inequality that is 
less and less socially structured.  
Though the empirical analysis did not allow us to disentangle the effects of structural and institutional 
changes in detail, the findings seem to suggests that partial labour market reforms – such as lowering 
restrictions against the use of temporary employment while leaving the level of protection of standard 
employment relations unchanged – clearly bear the risk of reinforcing social inequality. The recent 
examples of France and Spain, where the relaxation of regulations against the use of temporary 
employment led to an intensification of labour market segmentation (Blanchard and Landier 2002; 
Polavieja 2006), might underline this argument. However, as the analysis of this paper is confined to 
the case of temporary employment, it remains an open research question as to what extent this con-
clusion is supported for other forms of flexible employment relationships as well. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Changes in the Regulation of the Use of Temporary Contracts in Germany 1985-2005 
1985: Before 1985, fixed-term contracts could be used for a maximum duration of 6 months, and only 
for specific reasons like probationary period, special task completions, seasonal fluctuations, tempo-
rarily high volumes of work, deputization, on the-job-training and public employment measures. The 
main law regulating temporary employment was the “Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz“ (Law for the 
Improvement of Employment Opportunities) of January 1985.  Contract limitations up to 18 months 
were granted without specific reasons in certain cases, such as for a newly hired employee or suc-
cessful apprentices wishing to continue their employment if a permanent position wasn’t available. 
Contracts could be signed up to 24 months without specific reasons in businesses smaller than 20 
employees, providing there was no objective connection to a former contract within four months. A 
follow-up fixed-term contract was allowed in the case of specific reasons. 
1996: The second improvement of the Employment Opportunities Act of 1996 extended the opportuni-
ties for using fixed-term contracts. The existing restrictions to newly hired employees and successful 
apprentices were removed. The maximum duration of a fixed-term contract was raised to 24 months, 
and within this period it could be renewed three times. The maximum duration for a fixed-term contract 
for employees over 60 became unlimited. However, it was not allowed to sign a fixed-term contract 
after a foregoing fixed-term or permanent employment with the same employer within 4 months. 
Nevertheless, it became possible to add a fixed-term contract without specific reasons to a fixed-term 
employment with specific reasons. 
2001: In January 2001, Germany enacted a new law, the „Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz“ (Law of 
part-time and fixed-term employment relationship), which abolished the former Law for the Improve-
ment of Employment Opportunities. The maximum duration of a fixed-term contract remained 24 
months, and within this period it can be renewed three times. However, follow-up fixed-term contracts 
were forbidden if there was an earlier fixed-term employment contract between the employer and 
employee, regardless the bygone time. The age limit for older employees without limitations regarding 
the contract duration was reduced to 58. Anti-discrimination regulations guaranteed equal employment 
rights of fixed-term employees and open-ended employees with otherwise similar characteristics. 
2003: Germany enforced some new regulations with the “Erstes Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen 
am Arbeitsmarkt“ policy in 2003, which allowed unlimited fixed-term contracts for employees over the 
age of 52. This rule does not apply if there was a foregoing fixed-term employment with the same 
employer within 6 months. The 2003 policy “Gesetz zu Reformen am Arbeitsmarkt” allowed new busi-
nesses to sign fixed-term contracts without specific reasons for a maximum duration of four years. 
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Table A.2: Variable definitions 
Variable name Description 
  
Age  age group dummies 
age 16-25 16-25 years old 
age 26-35 26-35 years old 
age 36-45 36-45 years old 
age 46-55 46-55 years old 
age 56-65 reference category: 56-65 years old 
female dummy for sex (1= female; 0= male) 
german dummy for nationality (1= German; 0= Non-German) 
Education classification according to CASMIN 
elementary inadequately completed elementary education or (compulsory) 
elementary education (CASMIN1a, 1b) 
elementary + voc compulsory education plus vocational training (CASMIN 1c) 
intermediate/full secondary intermediate or full secondary education without vocational training 
(CASMIN 2b, 2cgen) 
intermediate/full secondary + 
voc 
intermediate or full secondary education with vocational training 
(CASMIN 2a, 2cvoc) 
higher technical college technical College (University of Applied Sciences) (CASMIN 3a) 
university reference group: university  (CASMIN 3b) 
Activity status last year dummies for activity status one year before 
employed reference group: employed  
In education in education 
unemployed unemployed  
inactive inactive 
Industry classification according to NACE revision 1.1 and public service 
information 
agriculture agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing (NACE A, B); not in public 
service 
manufacturing  reference group: manufacturing; electricity, gas and water supply 
(NACE C, D, E); not in public service 
construction construction (NACE F); not in public service 
trade wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods (NACE G); not in public service 
hotels/restaurants hotels and restaurants (NACE H); not in public service 
transport/communication transport, storage and communication (NACE I) ; not in public 
service 
finance/real estate/renting financial intermediation; real estate, renting and business activities, 
consulting (NACE J, K); not in public service 
public administration/ 
education/health 
public administration and defence; compulsory social security; edu-
cation; health and social work (NACE L, M, N); not in public service 
other services other community, social and personal service activities; activities of 
households; extra-territorial organisations and bodies (NACE O, P, 
Q); not in public service 
public service employment in public service 
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Table A.2 (continued): Variable definitions 
Variable name Description 
Firm size   
Firm size 1-10 dummy for firm size (1=1-10 employees; 0 else) 
Firm size 11-50 reference category:  
dummy for firm size (1=11-50 employees; 0 else) 
Firm size >51 dummy for firm size (1=more than 50 employees; 0 else) 
Occupational class classification according to EGP Class Scheme 
higher service (I) reference group: higher managers and professionals (EGP I) 
lower service (II) lower managers and professionals (EGP II) 
routine clericals (IIIa) routine clerical workers (EGP IIIa) 
routine service/sales (IIIb) routine service and sales workers (EGP IIIb) 
skilled manual (VI) skilled manual workers (EGP VI) 
semi-unskilled manual (VIIab) semi- and unskilled manual workers and agricultural labour (EGP 
VIIa and EGP VIIb) 
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Table A.3: Determinants of temporary employment, full specification, 1996-2005 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Age (Ref. 56-65) 
age 16-25 1.57*** 1.66*** 1.86*** 2.07*** 1.97*** 2.03*** 1.96*** 1.98*** 1.96*** 2.27*** 
 (14.2) (15.9) (17.8) (20.2) (19.5) (20.8) (19.9) (20.5) (20.9) (25.8) 
age 26-35 1.04*** 1.02*** 1.15*** 1.19*** 1.12*** 1.12*** 1.03*** 1.08*** 0.98*** 1.22*** 
 (10.2) (10.7) (12.0) (12.4) (11.9) (12.1) (11.1) (12.0) (11.2) (14.8) 
age 36-45 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.58*** 0.75*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.56*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.66*** 
 (4.7) (5.0) (5.9) (7.7) (6.5) (6.9) (6.1) (5.7) (5.7) (8.0) 
age 46-55 0.20* -0.02 -0.05 0.20* 0.09 0.24** 0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.12 
 (1.8) (-0.1) (-0.4) (1.9) (0.8) (2.4) (0.6) (-0.3) (0.3) (1.4) 
female 0.04 0.01 0.09** 0.09** 0.10** 0.04 0.15*** 0.04 0.04 0.08** 
 (0.8) (0.2) (2.0) (2.0) (2.2) (0.9) (3.2) (0.8) (0.8) (2.0) 
foreigner 0.73*** 0.59*** 0.36*** 0.56*** 0.41*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.32*** 
 (11.3) (8.7) (5.4) (9.2) (6.5) (7.9) (7.6) (6.7) (6.9) (5.5) 
Education (Ref. university) 
-0.81*** -0.84*** -0.78*** -0.71*** -0.97*** -0.64*** -0.67*** -0.51*** -0.69*** -0.77*** elementary  
(-8.6) (-8.9) (-8.7) (-8.1) (-10.8) (-7.5) (-7.4) (-5.8) (-7.7) (-9.0) 
-1.08*** -1.02*** -1.10*** -0.98*** -1.19*** -1.01*** -0.93*** -0.76*** -0.88*** -0.87*** elementary 
+ voc (-12.8) (-12.4) (-13.8) (-12.6) (-14.9) (-13.1) (-11.5) (-9.6) (-11.3) (-11.6) 
-0.42*** -0.49*** -0.51*** -0.43*** -0.53*** -0.45*** -0.30*** -0.40*** -0.44*** -0.49*** inter-
mediate/full 
secondary (-4.1) (-4.8) (-5.1) (-4.6) (-5.6) (-5.0) (-3.2) (-4.1) (-4.6) (-5.4) 
-1.16*** -1.15*** -1.24*** -0.99*** -1.19*** -1.06*** -1.05*** -0.88*** -0.87*** -0.83*** intermedi-
ate/full 
secondary + 
voc (-14.7) (-14.9) (-16.8) (-14.1) (-16.5) (-15.4) (-14.5) (-12.5) (-12.8) (-12.7) 
-0.98*** -0.95*** -0.94*** -0.82*** -0.92*** -0.89*** -0.82*** -0.79*** -0.96*** -0.71*** higher 
technical 
college (-9.9) (-10.1) (-10.3) (-8.7) (-10.1) (-9.2) (-8.2) (-7.9) (-9.6) (-7.8) 
Industry (Ref. manufacturing) 
0.60*** 0.65*** 0.74*** 0.65*** 0.67*** 0.63*** 0.68*** 0.43** 0.73*** 0.54*** agriculture 
(2.8) (3.6) (4.1) (3.6) (3.8) (3.5) (3.7) (2.2) (4.0) (3.0) 
0.13 -0.30*** -0.08 -0.05 -0.14 -0.16 -0.04 -0.16 -0.13 0.16 construction 
(1.3) (-2.7) (-0.8) (-0.5) (-1.4) (-1.5) (-0.3) (-1.4) (-1.2) (1.6) 
-0.06 -0.15* -0.11 0.11 -0.08 0.09 0.12 0.16** 0.09 0.19*** trade 
(-0.7) (-1.7) (-1.4) (1.4) (-1.1) (1.2) (1.5) (2.1) (1.2) (2.8) 
0.26* 0.28** 0.27** 0.43*** 0.18 0.28** 0.18 0.24* 0.40*** 0.17 hotels/res-
taurants (1.7) (2.1) (2.0) (3.5) (1.4) (2.3) (1.4) (1.8) (3.3) (1.4) 
0.10 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.30*** transport/co
mmunica-
tion (0.9) (-0.3) (0.0) (-0.4) (1.4) (1.4) (0.7) (0.1) (0.5) (3.0) 
-0.14 -0.17* -0.05 -0.10 -0.24*** -0.11 0.03 0.04 0.16** 0.14** finance/real 
estate/renti
ng (-1.4) (-1.8) (-0.5) (-1.2) (-2.9) (-1.3) (0.4) (0.5) (2.0) (2.0) 
0.71*** 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.53*** 0.66*** 0.62*** 0.65*** 0.57*** 0.72*** public 
administra-
tion/educa-
tion/health (7.6) (6.9) (7.4) (7.7) (6.5) (8.5) (7.5) (8.1) (7.0) (9.8) 
0.75*** 0.60*** 0.54*** 0.58*** 0.53*** 0.48*** 0.59*** 0.70*** 0.68*** 0.64*** other 
services (7.1) (5.6) (5.2) (5.7) (5.4) (4.8) (5.9) (6.8) (6.8) (6.9) 
0.90*** 0.76*** 0.70*** 0.75*** 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.83*** 0.79*** 0.83*** 0.65*** public 
service (13.8) (12.1) (11.4) (12.6) (11.6) (10.7) (13.2) (12.7) (13.5) (11.0) 
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Table A.3 (continued): Determinants of temporary employment, full specification, 1996-2005  
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Coef./t-
stat 
Firm size (Ref. 11-49)          
-0.20*** -0.16** -0.33*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.17*** -0.30*** -0.41*** Firm size 1-
10 (-2.8) (-2.4) (-4.8) (-5.4) (-5.0) (-4.2) (-3.9) (-2.7) (-4.9) (-7.2) 
0.11** 0.09* 0.10** 0.20*** 0.10** 0.00 0.10** 0.05 -0.02 0.05 Firm size 
>51 (2.1) (1.7) (2.1) (4.0) (2.0) (0.0) (2.0) (0.9) (-0.4) (1.0) 
Activity status last year (Ref. employed) 
2.02*** 2.21*** 1.96*** 2.00*** 1.69*** 1.62*** 1.77*** 1.66*** 1.71*** 1.67*** in education 
(23.2) (24.4) (22.6) (20.1) (17.1) (15.6) (15.9) (15.9) (15.2) (15.8) 
2.42*** 2.56*** 2.56*** 2.46*** 2.60*** 2.50*** 2.42*** 2.52*** 2.36*** 2.62*** unemployed 
(29.2) (32.0) (35.9) (32.5) (33.6) (31.3) (28.4) (31.9) (31.4) (38.0) 
1.36*** 1.44*** 1.44*** 1.30*** 1.42*** 1.29*** 1.33*** 1.26*** 1.40*** 1.53*** inactive 
(15.4) (18.8) (19.5) (17.9) (19.3) (17.6) (17.6) (15.9) (17.5) (18.9) 
Occupational class (Ref. higher service (I)) 
-0.61*** -0.64*** -0.51*** -0.48*** -0.54*** -0.52*** -0.61*** -0.65*** -0.60*** -0.56*** lower 
service (II) (-7.9) (-8.4) (-6.9) (-6.7) (-7.5) (-7.5) (-8.5) (-9.2) (-8.7) (-8.3) 
-0.51*** -0.48*** -0.40*** -0.36*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.49*** -0.51*** -0.50*** -0.32*** routine 
clericals 
(IIIa) (-5.4) (-5.3) (-4.6) (-4.3) (-3.5) (-3.7) (-5.7) (-6.2) (-6.0) (-4.2) 
-0.29*** -0.31*** -0.25*** -0.31*** -0.22** -0.25*** -0.23*** -0.37*** -0.28*** -0.11 routine 
service/sale
s (IIIb) (-3.1) (-3.3) (-2.8) (-3.6) (-2.5) (-3.0) (-2.7) (-4.4) (-3.5) (-1.4) 
-0.32*** -0.48*** -0.33*** -0.37*** -0.32*** -0.43*** -0.42*** -0.52*** -0.45*** -0.18** skilled 
manual (VI) (-3.3) (-5.0) (-3.5) (-4.2) (-3.5) (-4.8) (-4.5) (-5.7) (-4.9) (-2.2) 
0.31***    -0.33***   -0.24***   -0.17**    -0.14*     -0.32***   -0.24***   -0.33***   -0.29***   -0.15*** semi-
/unskilled 
manuals 
(VII)  (-3.5) (-3.8) (-2.9) (-2.1) (-1.7) (-4.0) (-3.0) (-4.0) (-3.7) (-2.1) 
constant -3.35*** -3.07*** -3.17*** -3.37*** -3.03*** -3.06*** -3.21*** -3.13*** -3.00*** -3.15*** 
 (-26.0) (-25.3) (-26.1) (-28.0) (-25.6) (-26.6) (-27.2) (-27.1) (-26.8) (-29.5) 
N 58497 57337 57773 56819 57718 58190 57713 56332 55791 54792 
Pseudo R2 0.155 0.163 0.167 0.150 0.151 0.137 0.140 0.140 0.141 0.154 
AIC 18170 18795 19797 21270 20890 21763 20499 20567 20894 22958 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Mikrozensus 1996-2005 data. 
Remark: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
